POLISH QUEST FOR THE NEW EUROPE: OPTIONS AND FORECASTS
Perhaps, Poland is still utterly
underestimated in Russia, albeit Poles themselves, barely aware
of their advantages, may be the possible reason for that. Poland
is a part of the EU G6 (Germany, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Spain, Poland) and the largest Central-Eastern European state. Proximity
to the EU economic engine of Germany gives Polish economy
a chance to develop dynamically.
Perhaps, Poland is still utterly
underestimated in Russia, albeit Poles themselves, barely aware
of their advantages, may be the possible reason for that. Poland
is a part of the EU G6 (Germany, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Spain, Poland) and the largest Central-Eastern European state. Proximity
to the EU economic engine of Germany gives Polish economy
a chance to develop dynamically.
Poland is the connecting bridge between Russia and the Western Europe.
Positive demographic dynamics and the accentuated European cultural identity
may be ascribed to its advantages. Besides, Poland
is a country of high intellectual culture and traditions. This,
perhaps, is the only large European country, where intellectual class was
developing outside of the 1968 trend, thus being deprived of the
ultra-left (anarchic-green) bias.
Today Poland is on the rise — in both economic and
intellectual senses. Yet, most of Poles are still influenced by two
ghosts of the past, looming over the Polish foreign policy. The first
ghost is the foisted off Polish image as the Western outpost facing
Russia — the Scythes, enemies of civilization etc. The second
one — is the imaginary Polish status as a «missionary»
of the Western influence in the East and, specifically
in Russia.
Both concepts may hardly secure Polish leadership, whichever terms
we define it with, whichever we interpret it. In the
first case Poland may actually become «the Trojan Horse of the USA»
in Europe (at best) and the large American military base —
still, only given the certain political layout in the USA itself.
At that, such policy hardly makes Poland more respectable and influential
in Europe. On the contrary, Poland owes an image
of a submissive «liege state» — widespread not just
in Russia — to this very policy.
In the second case poor knowledge of Russia — and the entire
post-Soviet space, speaking generally —brings Poland down. In reality
Russian will more willingly discuss the Western values with the suzerains
of the Global West — Brits and Americans — rather than with
Poles. At that, by the present moment Russia doesn’t treat Poland
as either an independent part of the West, nor as its most
complementary segment. Besides, styling oneself as a «mentor
of Russia» may be called a thankless and meaningless task
in advance. Russia is going through troubled times today, but
in general it quite fairly considers itself not just a country
with a distinctive religious and cultural identity, but also as one
of the leaders of global civilization. It goes without saying,
that Russia will never accept the role of an «acolyte» of the
Western school, whoever pretends for the mentor’s seat.
Lack of an adequate self-positioning in relations with Russia
is seen simultaneously with the Poles’ own prognostic thinking. Dramatic
discussions about future Russia (20, 30, 50 and 100 years from now) are
permanently under way in Russia these days. Poles, though, seemingly dwell
within some different foreseeable framework, being barely interested even
by the average-term prospects. Meanwhile, given the current trend
of development, Poles don’t have that many options. The first option
is the European Union turning into a full-fledged state, with Poland
and the other countries turning into the decorative autonomies
of a sort (like republics in the Soviet Union or Indian
reservations in the USA). In this case Poles would have
to denounce their identity, culture — perhaps, even language. Given
the fact that in the middle of the century the EU will face the
impact of a mighty immigration wave coming from the South and caused
by the rapid growth of Central and South-African population (and the
inevitable resettlement of more than a billion
of English-speaking and especially French-speaking Africans
to Europe), the very self-preservation of the Polish ethnos may
be questioned.
The second option is keeping the EU in its present state and
continuing the Polish game of pretending to be a superpower
satellite. In the long run this option means the decrease of the
Polish foreign-policy status and bringing it down to a level
of Bosnian and Kosovo administrations. Poles as a nation have
nothing to fear in this case, but the Poland itself should say
goodbye to the European (let alone global) influence. During the periods
of détente and resets Poland will be forgotten, during the «cold
wars» — turned into a depersonalized and stateless tool of the
stand.
Are there any other options? They obviously can be found, if one
looks forward, rather than backwards. Today we witness Russian and the
Western European (German most of all) interest in the economic
approach to each other. At that, there are plenty of ideological
and mental contradictions between Russian and its potential partners.
Conservative Russian mentality and the Trend of 1968 (left-wing liberal
and anti-traditional revolutionary trend) triumphed over the Western capitals
are largely incompatible with each other.
I’d still risk suggesting, though, that Poles might have mediated the
discussion between Russia and its Western partners. Regardless, of whether
Poles themselves are aware of this or not, but their mentality
is still closer to Russia, that the German or French ones. Once
the readiness of Polish intellectuals and Polish expert society
supplements this, that dialogue may apparently take place for real.
At that, we have to clearly see the difference between the
dialogue of states and the informal one of societies. At the
state level, it is France, headed by Nicolas Sarkozy, that
attempts to assume the role of mediator between Russian and political
Europe — and we have to give him that credit,
it is quite successful at that.
Germany also attempted to assume the same mission under Schröder’s rule.
Problem, however, is caused by the fact that state dialogue
of that level featured an insufficient media, intellectual and expert
support. Among the latter ones Russia often draws only negative emotions,
which, in my opinion, are rooted not just in the rational
apprehensions regarding Russia, but in the irrational disapproval
of Russian conservative mentality, their concepts of family,
religion, national state etc.
Having survived the furious attack at these institutions in the
20th century, Russia is also unwilling to lose them today.
These feelings seem alien and inconceivable to the Western-European
intellectuals, who were fostered on the ideas of Marcuse, Gramsci and
Trotsky, risen by the wave of the youth rebellion of the 1960s.
Yet, the Polish intelligentsia — the part of it that seeks for
new approaches and is disgusted by propagandistic clichés —
is more capable to profoundly understand Russian mentality than the
Western-European intellectuals.
In the 20th century wars ceased to be a lot
of career military — trained accordingly and obeying to their
professional code. It were nations, rather than armies, which filled the
battlefields of the WWI and WWII, triggering the unthinkable tragedies and
radical reformatting of the planetary system. In the modern world the
same process — albeit with the opposite «+» sign, perhaps — may
be seen in foreign affairs. In the 21st century
global affairs are no more the privilege of a close circle
of specialists, than the military affairs were in the 20th
century. Invention of the Internet and erasure of the information
borders created the new threats, yet it would be naïve omitting the
new doors, they open to us. Dialogue about the European future is one
of such doors — there’s a considerable probability that
it may succeed only within the public-expert environment; among people,
whose activity is defined by their intellectual capital and social
energy, which may be used for creative efforts, rather than by their
status within some political, media or business hierarchy.
Succeeding in this dialogue, Poland may turn into the cultural axle
of the Greater Europe. Not the current political Europe within the EU
borders, but the Greater Europe from Vladivostok to Gibraltar, where the
West (the EU) and the East (Russia) mutually complement each other.
By Alexander Rublev
It’s curious that even Jordan, author of «Goth History» claimed that
the border between Scythia and Germany goes along Vistula. The only matter
is that in such layout ancestors of Poles fetch themselves
on the other side of Vistula and the Medieval Polish historian ascend
the Polish genealogy up to Sarmatians.
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