HUMANIST DIALOG
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE:
What do we need from each other?
Recently started dialog between Russia and the
Ukraine still remains inferior: humanitarian sphere by no means make
up the central subject of negotiation process. It seems that its
participants lack general understanding of what do they need from
each other. Some experts believe that the Ukraine is to reverse all
of its Yushchenko-Timoshenko linguistic reforms in order
to improve the situation. Still there are people who consider this subject
to be a "Pandora’s box" that is better to be left
alone for now. Whose estimates are more precise?
Recently started dialog between Russia and the
Ukraine still remains inferior: humanitarian sphere by no means make
up the central subject of negotiation process. It seems that its
participants lack general understanding of what do they need from
each other. Some experts believe that the Ukraine is to reverse all
of its Yushchenko-Timoshenko linguistic reforms in order
to improve the situation. Still there are people who consider this subject
to be a "Pandora’s box" that is better to be left
alone for now. Whose estimates are more precise?
What can define the shape of the cultural dialog? What ideas — apart
from the antagonistic ones — may the Ukrainian nation ground upon? How
exactly is the Ukraine to use the resources of the Russian
language? Denis Kiryukhin — expert of the Kiev Centre for Political
Research and Conflictology (KCPRC) — shared his opinion on that
matter with us.
— Part of the Ukraine-specialized Russian experts stick
to the opinion that Russo-Ukrainian humanitarian cooperation should start
from the certain steps of protecting the Russian language — such
as adoption of new Basic Law on Language and/or the law
on implementation of European Charter on the Regional
or Minority Languages. So is the Russian language really
infringed upon in the Ukraine?
— In today’s Ukraine problem of the Russian language
is a rather sharp issue indeed. We may cite various examples,
starting from the educational system — Russian-speaking line
of education has been actually destroyed in the country —
up to the fact that all the foreign movies, produced not
in Russia and shown at the Ukrainian cinemas, are
to be obligatorily dubbed into Ukrainian. We may also refer
to the television and radio system that features strict quotas for
broadcasting in Russian. All of that makes up the evidence
of the fact that the Ukrainian authorities have already been carrying out
the policy of restricting and restraining Russian language in the
country for many years now. In particular, such policy has a logical
consequence — inappropriate for any legal democratic state situation
emerged, when the significant part of Russian-speaking Ukrainians
is deprived of the ability to educate their children
in Russian.
Take Kiev for example. Statistics data indicates that in 2007 only
7 comprehensive schools out of 504 were teaching its pupils
in Russian (in a percentage ratio it means that just
3% of Kiev pupils studied Russian), and speaking of state
Russian-speaking kinder gardens — there are none at all! Mind that
according to official data, Russian language is a native one for
more than a quarter of the capital population. Even in Latvia
situation is better by far. In Riga (which population
is three times smaller than the Kiev one) there are, as far
as I know, 64 Russian-speaking schools.
Of course — and we have to remember that
as well — not every single Russian couple wants their children
to be taught in Russian. Social research data — which was
gathered due to the request of KCPRC — indicates that part
of Ukrainian citizens that considers Russian language
to be their native, prefers their own children to study
at schools where the teaching goes solely or mostly
in Ukrainian. Nevertheless, we may confidently state that the
abilities of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, willing their children
to be taught in Russian, are significantly restrained.
On the other hand, we may not leave the concerns of certain
politicians and public activists, standing up for the development
of Ukrainian language, without concern. In particular, they are
paying attention to the emerged situation when certain spheres
of public life feature supremacy of the Russian language over the
Ukrainian, which interferes with the development and strengthening of the
state language. Indeed, circulation of the Russian-language newspapers
in the Ukraine is approximately two times larger than the circulation
of the Ukrainian-language ones (this data relates to 2008) and the
current economic recession had the most impact especially on the
Ukrainian-language printed media as the less demanded one. However, the
language issue among the press is more of an exception than
a rule. Ukrainian laws do not confine the language of printed
media, so it is market-defined. Meanwhile, most part
of newspaper and magazine buyers live in the cities and among the
urban environment Russian as a language of communication
certainly prevails. This explains why the most wide-spread newspapers and
magazines in the country are the Russian-language ones.
As the social researches indicate, majority of Ukrainian-speaking
citizens lack Ukrainian-language press. Nevertheless, this group is six
times larger than the number of Russian-speaking citizens who also lack
printed media in Russian.
Given example — as I see it — indicates that the issue
of coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian languages is too sharp
for them to freely function and develop.
Despite the importance of this "linguistic issues", I consider
it intolerable making the Russian-Ukrainian humanitarian cooperation
to be the hostage of its solution. Development of this
cooperation is advantageous for both Russia and the Ukraine. In this
sense we are partners of equal value.
— What exactly areas of contact are we talking
about?
That may be the mutual interests towards the cultural achievements
of the other side, joint search of solution to the humanitarian
problems, characteristic for both Ukrainian and Russian communities and,
finally, interest towards creation of the shared humanitarian environment
that would allow to bring the joint scientific and cultural projects
to life. In other words — it is the aim towards common
future. I’d stress that, we’re talking not about the reviving of the
unified state — this idea does not have much of public support
neither in the Ukraine, nor, as far as I know,
in Russia — but rather about mutually beneficial and mutually
enriching kind of cooperation, including the one in the humanitarian
sphere.
We already have the resources to set up that cooperation. First
of all — it is our intertwined histories, religions,
cultures and languages. There are no barriers, impeding the mutual
understanding and creation of the common goals between us. This
resource just makes the dialog easier.
Along with that, we also have some obstacles on the way
of humanitarian cooperation. Perhaps, the greatest of them
is the yet undefined shape of Ukrainian national project. On the
one hand this is the ethno-cultural project that has a vivid
anti-Russian orientation, on the other hand — this
is a project of a civic nation that may compete but not
antagonize Russia. Your country has already gone through the period
of aggravating public debates over the destiny of Russia and the
possible paths of its development that went under way in the 90s with
its calls to get back to the pre-modern cultural origins of Rus.
I, however, believe that the formation of the post-Soviet national
identity is not done in Russia as well.
I’d like to pay your attention to the fact that during his address
in connection with hundred days of incumbency, Viktor Yanukovych
actually postulated his point of view towards the model of the
Ukrainian nation for the first time, claiming the creation of republic
as the union of the citizens, consolidated around the shared interest
for the development of the country to be his goal.
— Yanukovych used to mention it previously. What’s the
difference from his prior calls to respect the multi-cultural nature
of the Ukraine?
— First of all, his status, while he said these words.
In this case Yanukovych acted as the President of the country,
not just a leader of a certain political party. Second
of all, unlike the previous, quite fuzzy statements, this one was
absolutely clear. New ideological format of the Ukrainian state means the
new horizons of abilities. The question is whether the Ukrainian
authorities would have the guts to be consecutive and persistent
enough to bring them to life.
— Still it turns out that the main idea of the state
is that "the Ukraine is not Russia". Is there anything positive
that the Ukraine can bring into the principle state idea?
— Frankly speaking, civic political project of nation-building
in the Ukraine is rather weak. In fact, Ukrainian statehood
is grounded upon the ethno-cultural project — these exact
circumstances explain the passionarity of the Western Ukrainian regions.
That gives a state the vector of development even today. Actually,
even in spite of significant change in rhetoric of the
Ukrainian authorities, it is still influenced by this
vector.
Within the framework of the state project, Russia was allotted with
a peculiar place — it is to remain the part
of internal Ukrainian space, some kind of its alter ego forever;
Ukrainian national identity itself is being built on the contrast
with it.
— Is the contraposition of Russia and the Ukraine
inevitable?
— It’d be more correct if we would have spoken not
of the inevitability of the stand, but rather about keeping
a certain distance between us. It depends both upon actions
of the Ukraine and Russia, what would that distance become —
separating barrier between the enemy lines or just a border line that
would turn out to be the stimulus of developing the mutually
beneficial cooperation.
Path, that the young Ukrainian state appealed to in the beginning
of the 90s — i. e. return to the ethno-national origins and
creation of the collective identity based on the Ukrainian
ethno-cultural grounds — is not the original one. Politicization
of the ethno-cultural resource draws the Ukraine together with the whole
number of so-called post-Soviet countries that have suffered complex and
painful process of social, political and ideological transformations after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even the natural
nationalism of that kind somehow indicates the mental similarity
of Russians and Ukrainians.
Here’s a curious example: research of the common concepts
of justice in Russia and the Ukraine (conducted by the Institute
of Philosophy of the Ukraine) demonstrates the similarity in the
Ukrainian and Russian concepts of justice, and, at the same time, the
differences of these concepts from the European ones. In particular,
only in Russia and the Ukraine (we may also assume that the same
situation would take place in Byelorussia, as well) there’s
a significant number of people perceiving justice as the truth.
Mind that equation of justice and truth is an ethical-legal
concept that has been formed exactly within the framework of the Orthodox
cultural-religious tradition and which is much less characteristic
of the Western mentality.
— If our mentalities are alike, what makes us antagonize each
other? Politics and stereotypes "multiplied" by the media?
— Indeed our worldview is often the same. Still, we have some
obvious differences between us. In a political sense, for
example, pronounced etatisme is very characteristic of Russians while
it is much less peculiar of the Ukrainians. The latter,
as a matter of fact, orientate not towards the state as the
regulator of the social life, but they rather believe that these relations
itself are to be defined by the ethical norms in the first
place...We should also pay attention to the fact that the Ukraine still
didn’t reach the public consent on some important issue, including the
issue of relationship with Russia. Part of the society
is oriented towards the development of tight and friendly
relationship. But significant part of Ukrainians still believe any closer
approach of Kiev and Moscow to be the threat to the
Ukrainian sovereignty, threat to the state national project and thus, they
equate policy of Ukrainization with the policy of protecting the
independence of a young state.
— Does that mean that Ukrainian language — comparing
to Russian — is uncompetitive and its "living functions" are
supported artificially?
— Given today’s circumstances, two strategies of development
of Ukrainian language are possible:
1. Directory mono-linguistic model when Russian language is ousted from
every single sphere of public life using various political and
administrative arrangements. Viktor Yushchenko was trying to bring
it to life — during his interview at the "Echo
of Moscow" ("Ekho Moskvy" in Russian transcription) he used
to say that Russian is the "language of the greatest neighbor".
In other words, he didn’t treat Russian language as a part
of the Ukrainian national identity...During the years of his
presidency it became clear that such model is ineffective —
it just provokes the social tensions but doesn’t improve the positions
of Ukrainian;
2. Model of positive discrimination. Its essence consists of giving
certain preferences to Ukrainian — the ones that were to secure
its development and improve its positions in the public life without
implicating any administrative restrictions against the Russian language. This
approach, however, demands more reasonable and systematic work and implies
greater financial costs as well. Perhaps, because of the latter
circumstance no one in the Ukraine had actually attempted
to bring this model to life before.
— Why no one in the Ukraine treats knowing Russian
as an advantage, rather than the burden?
— Most part of Ukrainian citizens do not treat Russian
as some kind of burden, that hangs over the country. On the
contrary, they believe their bilingual culture to be the competitive
advantage other the monolingual neighboring countries. We have
to admit that the Ukraine has a great layer of Russian-speaking
Ukrainian culture, expressed in the works of Maximilian Voloshin,
Nikolay Danilevsky, Nikolay Gogol, Taras Schevchenko. The Ukraine is not
monolingual. And it is extremely doubtful that it would ever
be such. But it would also be a mistake to think that
most part of Ukrainian citizens — including those who speak mostly
Russian — would be willing to give their preferences to the
Russian language.
There’s quite a number of stereotypes regarding the Russian-speaking
Ukrainians that are wide-spread in Russia as well. For example,
usually it is considered that if someone speaks Russian
he also wants his children to be Russian-speakers.
In reality the situation is not that definite. This particularly
follows from the research of the Russian language in the Ukraine,
conducted due to the order of KCPRC by the Kiev international
Institute of Social Science and the Social Service "SOCIS" in 2009.
It turned out that part of Russian-speaking Ukrainians — mostly
inhabiting the central regions of the country i. e. ethnic
Ukrainians — think of their ability to speak only Russian
as of disadvantage and wish their children to speak Ukrainian.
These people think that they are the products of the forced Russification
that the Soviet authorities were conducting in the second half of the
20th century. Having spoken Russian, they still believe Ukrainian
to be "truly" their language.
The indicated phenomenon is explained in a following way.
Collapse of the Soviet Union made a great boost towards developing
the ethnic identities at the post-Soviet space. Inside some
of Ukrainians a conflict between their linguistic (as the
Russian-speakers) and the ethno-cultural (as the Ukrainians) identities
took place. Taking the special stress that has been made on the
ethno-cultural factor (among the rest of them) into consideration, there’s
no surprise that the ethno-cultural identity of these people prevails
over the linguistic one. As a result of that, they perceive
their ability to speak Russian or the imperfect skill
of speaking Ukrainian practically as their personal defect. That’s
why they are sending their children into the Ukrainian-speaking schools. They
have a positive attitude towards the fact that their children are being
raised up exclusively as a native Ukrainians. As far
as I know, similar processes were revealed among the Russian-speaking
citizens of the Baltic States.
— What awaits the Ukraine — everlasting "gap" between Russia and
the European Union?
— Yes, the risk of staying in the "grey zone" is quite real
indeed. During Yushchenko rule, the Ukraine strived to act as local
leader within the so-called Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region.
It is obvious though, that this geopolitical project has failed.
Nevertheless, we have to admit: Moldova, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and
Kazakhstan are interested in each other, which means the potential for
developing the future cooperation. And this is where the special role
really belongs to the Ukraine. Problem is that during the previous
years our country lost many of its positions at the international
arena, particularly at the strategically important region of Central
Asia. Now we would have to overtake what we have lost.
Interviewed by Oleg Gorbunov
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