A JAIL FOR A THIEF. A THIEF FOR
A JAIL.
A reflection on the verdict in the Khodorkovsky
& Lebedev trial
There doesn’t seem to be any common
ground between critics and supporters of the guilty verdict in the
trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev. (I feel obliged
to at least mention Lebedev, if only once, in this piece.
Hey, the man was accused of the same crimes as Khodorkovsky and got
exactly the same punishment. Yet, in contrast to his superstar
co-defendant, no one in the West calls this guy with a typical
Russian surname a "political prisoner", nor suggests that his arrest
in 2003 was a "watershed moment" in contemporary Russian
history.)
There doesn’t seem to be any common
ground between critics and supporters of the guilty verdict in the
trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
Platon
Lebedev. (I feel obliged to at least mention Lebedev,
if only once, in this piece. Hey, the man was accused of the
same crimes as Khodorkovsky and got exactly the same punishment. Yet,
in contrast to his superstar co-defendant, no one in the
West calls this guy with a typical Russian surname
a "political prisoner", nor suggests that his arrest
in 2003 was
a "watershed moment" in contemporary Russian
history.)
Speaking of the verdict’s critics, the West’s obsession with Khodorkovsky
has long struck me as a cultural phenomenon of sorts.
I could in principle contemplate Khodorkovsky as being
a "prisoner of conscience" — depending, of course,
on how you define "conscience" (or lack thereof). Yet comparing
Khodorkovsky to Andrei Sakharov, as Jackson Diehl of the
Washington Post recently
did, should insult anyone who knows what the great Sakharov
stood for. And
awarding Khodorkovsky with the Rainer-Hildebrand medal "for
non-violent commitment to human rights" simply borders on insanity.
(I’m just curious: is there a medal/award for a "violent
commitment to human rights"?) Moreover, if the recent performance
of the clowns from the
Nobel Peace Prize Committee is a prediction
of their future actions, then Khodorkovsky will undoubtedly top the list
of contenders for this year’s
Nobel
Peace Prize.
Khodorkovsky’s fans maintain that he was convicted on "trumped-up
charges" and that the real reason for his persecution was his support for
"opposition parties" in Russia. I’m not a lawyer, but after having
read a 2006 legal opinion written by Peter Clateman, I remain
convinced that the charges against K&L were real and proved
by documents. So before I listen to the "trumped-up
charges" argument, I’d like anyone with more legal experience to please
explain to me why Mr. Clateman’s analysis is wrong.
(The often made claim that the Khodorkovsky case was one of "selective
prosecution" doesn’t make me cry, either. Sure, every prosecution
is selective, and this selectivity reflects the ability of any state
to prosecute only as many cases as it has the resources
for. It’s outside the frame of this post to discuss cases
of "selective prosecution" elsewhere, but even in the U. S.,
it’s not unheard of that among many potential criminal investigations, the
prosecution unmistakeably selects the one involving a big name. The 2004
Martha
Stewart’s ridiculous stock trading case immediately springs
to mind.)
As for Khodorkovsky’s "real crimes", I’d recommend for all those
interested to re-read a five-part investigative report published
by Izvestia
in 2006, titled "What is Mikhail Khodorkovsky sitting for?"
("За что сидит Михаил Ходорковский",
Part 1,
2,
3,
4,
5). The Izvestia report makes it abundantly clear that
those believing that Khodorkovsky was supporting "opposition parties" are
either ignorant or have a passion for "trumped-up" evidence. True,
during the 1999 Duma election campaign, Khodorkovsky supported the liberal
Yabloko,
a perennial "opposition party" due to its constant poor election
performance. But he also financed the Communists (calling them
"opposition" is somewhat awkward given that at the time, the
KPRF had the largest faction in Duma) and
pro-Putin Edinstvo
(Unity).
Such a diversified investment had nothing to do with
Khodorkovsky’s ideological flexibility: he didn’t fund "opposition
parties"; what he was funding was the so-called Oil Lobby, a group
of Duma deputies belonging to different parties that were
successfully promoting legislation favorable to Khodorkovsky’s
YUKOS.
According to different calculations, the Oil Lobby consisted
of between 100 and 200+ Duma deputies (of 450 total) and was
headed by a Vladimir Dubov, who happened to represent the
ruling, pro-Kremlin and pro-Putin,
United
Russia party. Funding "opposition parties" indeed! (After Khodorkovsky’s
arrest in 2003, Dubov suddenly aborted his brilliant legislative career
and emigrated to Israel.)
Turning now to the supporters of the guilty verdict, I must say
that I don’t share their glee, either. Sure, I agree with
Gleb Zheglov and his admirers that "a thief should sit
in jail." The question is: for how long? It goes without saying
that a guilty verdict in a criminal case will serve its purpose
of a public message only if this verdict can be understood
by ordinary citizens. No, I’m not talking about legalities such
as "fraud", "tax evasion", and "embezzlement." But people should
be convinced that a thief goes to jail because
he is a thief. That’s why the guilty verdict in the first
K&L trial was generally accepted as fair. The very reason
Khodorkovsky’s supporters kept talking about "selected persecution" and his
support of "opposition parties" was because they couldn’t challenge the
legal basis of his conviction. Because deep down, they knew that
Khodorkovsky was a thief.
The second trial is different exactly because it’s difficult
to understand which crime has been punished. Khodorkovsky has been
in jail since 2003 and obviously couldn’t committ any additional crimes.
Even if a difference between "tax evasion" and "embezzlement" does
exist, why weren’t these embezzlement charges brought forward during the first
trial? Because the prosecution was in a hurry? Or because people
pushing for the trial believed that Khodorkovsky’s eight years in jail
will last forever? But bringing these charges now doesn’t make any sense
to a common person like me. It’s like saying: "Sorry, guys,
we did a sloppy job in 2005 and we want to correct
this mistake. So, please, sit in jail for a few more
years." Therefore, the major problem
with the second K&L trial, as I see it, is that
it undermines the legitimacy of the first.
Up until now, President Medvedev didn’t "own" the K&L trial:
he didn’t initiate it, he didn’t support it, and
he didn’t benefit from the YUKOS destruction. For as long
as Khodorkovsky was serving his first prison term, Medvedev could safely
deflect all the inquiries to his predecessor. Now, things have changed.
The long shadow the guilty verdict in the second trial has cast upon
Russia in the eyes of the world public opinion is Medvedev’s
problem now. And he has to do something about it.
Khodorkovsky is a thief and will remain one for the rest of his
life, regardless of whether he’s in jail or not. But Russia
doesn’t have to look like a jail to the rest of the
world.
Eugene Ivanov
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